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Conrad_Jalowski
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Registered: 11-16-2008

The Concepts behind Bonaparte's Italian Campaigns from 1796-1797

What is war? Carl von Clausewitz stated that war was composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity; for the imposition of one's own will upon others. Furthermore, Clausewitz stated that war is controlled chaos that is unleashed initially with the intention of the annihilation and subjugation of the opposition but may become erratic and chaotic, and turn upon those who unleashed such a potent force. Clausewitz as well as the Neo-Clausewitzians maintain that the greatest goal of subjugation is for the annihilation of the opposing armies. To deprive the opposition of all available troop formations would demoralize and eradicate most of the resistance. Such a proposed case is far too simplistic, however. (As in the case of Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus as written by military theorist Basil Henry Liddell Hart, decided that the capture of key cities such as capitals was a greater priority than eradicating inimical armies as without cities, the enemy would be deprived of key logistics, supply routes, and access to fortified cities and other key defensive positions. Since Carthage was a thalassocracy, depriving it of its key maritime base and main area of operations, Nova Carthago or 'New Carthage', the individual armies would become isolated and deprived of supplies and key resources.) Carl von Clausewtiz called the area that acted as the sole means of a nation's integrity and cohesiveness as the 'center of gravity'. In essence, all depended on the situation as to whether to destroy the opposing armies or to capture the key cities of the inimical state.

 

Carl von Clausewitz further stated that military success does not always lead to hegemonic domination. Whilst fellow military theorists of Clausewitz such as Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini mainly concentrated on military operations, there were very few references to political, diplomatic and economic affairs. For Clausewitz, all aspects were interrelated and only when amalgamated could offer an in-depth ancd comprehensive viewpoint of social change and the results of particular periods of upheaval. Other theorists such as Dietrich Heinrich von Bulow concentrated solely on military developments whilst political, diplomatic and economic historians only make passing remarks to military developments. 

 

Hugo Grotius theorized on the interrelations between warfare and the international political and diplomatic scene. According to Grotius, all actions of the particular nation arise out of the considerations of geopolitical and geostrategic affairs. Grotius was a major proponent of the Rationalist School of diplomatic policies. (The others were the Realist Tradition of Thucydides and Thomas Hobbes, the Revolutionary Tradition of Immanuel Kant, and the Mazzini tradition.) Though 'autarchies' or states of self-sufficiency were advocated by Grotius (which would arise out of the Westphalian Peace as to the destructive era of the Eighty years' War: 1568-1648 and the Thirty years' War: 1618-1648, and the Wars of Louis XIV such as the Spanish Succession: 1701-1714 with the treaties of Utrecht and Rastadt, and be mirrored in the Congress of Vienna as a reactionary movement to the concept of the nation-state), he did not view that states are receptive solely to self-interest but to the preservation of political equipollence, or a balance of powers.

 

Some events in Italy leading up to the Italian Campaigns of 1796-1797 were the 1. Great Italian Wars from 1494-1559 and the 2. War of the Spanish Succession from 1701-1714. In 1.), the equipollence consisted of Milan, the Papal States, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, Florence and the Venetrian Republic. The concept of the balance of powers was first practiced  in Early Modern Europe by Francesco Sforza who was a condottiere who usurped the ducal coronet of Milan and replaced the Visconti line of Milan. (Such events of the Italian conflicts were recorded by Francesco Guicciardini and noted by Niccolo Machiavelli). The results of the Great Italian Wars was the loss of Italian autonomy to great kingdoms and their reduction to second-rate powers, as well as the utter suzerainty of the Spanish Habsburgs  over most of Italy. In 2.), Louis XIV  of the Kingdom of France and Navarre featured such marshals as Turenne and Nicolas Catinat against Austrian Habsburg Prince Eugene of Savoy-Carignan, Piedmontese King Victor Amadeus II and British John Churchill, First Duke of Marlborough. The results were the transfers of the Lower Netherlands, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, Milan and Carniola, Carinthia and the Tyrol to the Austrian Habsburgs thus upsetting the previous balance of powers.

 

The War of Italy from 1796-1797 consisted of such battles as Montenotte, Millesimo, San Michele, Ceva, Lodi, Bassano, Rovento, Mondavi, Arcole Rivoli and Mantua amongst many others. The 'Grand Strategy' of the French Directorate consisted of such: Jean-Victor Marie Moreau as general of the Rhine. The main thrust would come from the Army of the Rhine and was viewed by the Five-Man Directorate as the most important theatre of operation. General Kellerman was in command of the Army of the Alps that would act as a transition between the Army of the Rhine and the Army of Italy and would act as a reserve line for future operations and to control the flow of supplies to Italy and Germany. The Army of Italy was led by General Bonaparte. The Directors had apparently overlooked the maxim of the concentration of force at the decisive point as the greatest means to victory as opposed to scattered and isolated formations. Despite such formidable obstacles, such as the dangers of a tripartite assault, the French consolidated their gains in Northern Italy and pushed back the Austrian Habsburgs all along the Rhine River.

In addition, the War of the Second Coalition featured General Moreau winning a decisive victory against the Austrian Archduke John at Hohenlinden, and First (Premier) Consul Bonaparte winning the battle of Marengo against the Austrian Habsburgs.

 

In essence, what are your opinions on military theory as based on geostrategic and geopolitical concerns as during Bonaparte's Italian Campaigns from 1796-1797, and the War of the Second Coalition. Also, are military concepts interrelated with diplomatic, social, political and economic factors? Please, explain your reasonings.

"A World-Historical individual is devoted to the One Aim, regardless of all else. It is even possible that such men may treat other great, even sacred interests inconsiderately; conduct which is indeed obnoxious to moral reprehension. But so mighty a form must trample down many an innocent flower or crush to pieces many an object in its path."

From G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of History in Jacob Loewenberg (ed.), Hegel: Selections (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1929), pp. 376-80.