Tried by War: Let's Talk About McClellan

[L_Monty]

I'm not a huge fan of military history. It's hard for me to read, because I have difficulty visualizing the field of battle or the surrounding terrain, and the little details of movement escape me. But James McPherson's Tried by War eschews battlefield minutiae to give us an idea of larger strategic movements as Lincoln would have understood them. One thing that's easy — and, frankly, horrifying — to understand is the dilatoriness and outright insubordination of General George B. McClellan. McPherson writes (bold emphasis mine):

The rebels again defeated Banks in the Battle of Cedar Mountain, McClellan learned of this outcome wtih satisfaction. He predicted that Pope "will be badly thrashed within two days... very badly whipped he will be & ought to be—such a villain as he is ought to bring defeat upon any cause that employs him." Then "they will be very glad to turn over the redemption of their affairs to me. I won't understake it unless I have full and entire control."

These words help explain why McClellan seemed to be in no hurry to obey orders to reinforce his despised rival. He received these orders from Halleck on August 3. The first units did not leave until August 14. The last troops finally embarked Fort Monroe for Washington on September 3.... "I don't see how I can remain in the service if placed under Pope—it would be too great a disgrace," he wrote to his wife. But if "Pope is beaten," which McClellan expected, "they may want me to save Washn. again." Once they "suffer a terrible defeat" and Pope is "disposed of... I know that with God's help I can save them." (p. 114)

McClellan's opinion of Pope was scarcely a secret, nor was that of Gen. Fitz-John Porter, McClellan's protégé and commander of two Army of the Potomac divisions that had joined the Army of Virginia. "Pope is a fool," wrote Porter, and the administration that had appointed him was no better. In a sentence that could be construed as treasonable, he added: "Would that this army was in Washington to rid us of incumbents ruining our country."

"There must be no further delay in moving Franklin's corps toward Manassas," Halleck wired McClellan on the evening of August 28. McClellan replied that Franklin would march in the morning. But the next day he halted Franklin six miles out, in direct disobedience of Halleck's orders and within hearing range of Pope's Battle.

In the midst of this crisis McClellan sent a telegram to Lincoln that seemed to reveal his real reason for halting Franklin's corps and failing to hurry up Sumner's. Although McClellan acknowledged that he was under orders "to open up communications with Pope," he implied that a better alternative might be "to leave Pope to get out of his scrape & at once use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe." Lincoln was shocked by these words. McClellan "wanted Pope defeated," he told John Hay. Circumstantial evidence seems to support Lincoln's accusation. (p. 118-9)

McPherson is obviously a fan of Lincoln, and some historians argue that these statements and actions by McClellan have been exaggerated in subsequent years to cast Lincoln in the best light and shift blame for failures onto figures disconnected from Lincoln. Do you think a case can be made for McClellan's actions here and elsewhere? Also, why do you think these kinds of actions aren't seen in the last century of American combat? What's changed about our understanding of the function of the military and the commander in chief? Can Lincoln be credited with cementing our understanding of the latter?

[gegarland]

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L_Monty wrote:

McPherson is obviously a fan of Lincoln, and some historians argue that these statements and actions by McClellan have been exaggerated in subsequent years to cast Lincoln in the best light and shift blame for failures onto figures disconnected from Lincoln. Do you think a case can be made for McClellan's actions here and elsewhere? Also, why do you think these kinds of actions aren't seen in the last century of American combat? What's changed about our understanding of the function of the military and the commander in chief? Can Lincoln be credited with cementing our understanding of the latter?

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There's a concept called the "fog of battle/war". A great captain like Lee, Grant, Napoleon, etc., can impose their will on the situation and force their army to fight. People like McClellan become more and more paralyzed by their fear of the unknown the closer they come to the actual conflict. McClellan was famous for claiming that he was somehow badly outnumbered by Lee, and always demanding more troops and support before he could act. Of course, some generals know they are not on the A-Team, but McClellan's ego would not let him realize that he was the problem and not everyone else on the northern side. Some people believe that if McClellan had won the presidency in 1864, he would have made peace and let the south leave. I think that self-same ego would instead have led him to take the victory that would have been obviously about to fall into his lap by the time of his inauguration and claim it as his own.

As far as the relationship between the military and the civilian government, I think the legacy of George Washington simply resigning his command at the end of the Revolutionary War cemented the relationship in a way that has never been seriously challenged since. I believe Lincoln did an amazing job with an army and navy that had to be jumped up from almost nothing to millions of men at a moments notice, but America as whole was still very slow to understand the need for a large-scale permanent military like we have today. It was not until after WWII (or even Korea) that we finally started to make those institutions into the form the have now.

[PhilsFolly]

   I can think of one comparison from the Cold War era that certainly mirrors the arrogance of General McClellan's insubordination.  As an untried president, raised to that position with the death of FDR, Harry Truman found himself upstaged in the early 1950s by an arrogant media-hound, General Douglas MacArthur. The self-proclaimed "American Ceasar" courted the press and repeatedly challenged the command decisions of the C-N-C.    MacArthur's boastful title of his autobiography certainly rivals Little Mac's claim to be the "Young Napoleon."  

    Neither lived up to his boast. MacArthur suffered from a brashness based on a faulty understanding of the Cold War stakes of challenging the Chinese as well as the Soviets (who possessed at this time a nuclear capability).  Little Mac, on the other hand, suffered from the desire to command the Army of the Potomac, but not the desire or tactical ability to use it effectively. Simply stated, McClellan desired the accolades of the D.C. newspapers, and wished to remain in the capital and drill his troops.  According to McPherson, General McClellan never understood that the best strategy was to engage the Confederates on as many fronts as possible, to utilize the greater manpower of the Union and to grind the Confederates into submission.  McClellan, like MacArthur, never saw the big picture.  

  Both Generals courted the media and criticized the inexperience of their respective presidents. Both generals deserved to be brought up on charges.  The presidents they spoke of with such disdain had a far better grasp of the political realities of war.  This is one of the themes that McPherson illuminates so very well, and is the underlying theme of his book.  Lincoln, like Truman, was perceived by the Washington and West Point elitists as an inexperienced western rube to be manipulated by the military and kept on the defensive by a hostile media. As McPherson points out, Lincoln's patience with McClellan (and his other Union commanders through the summer of 1863) was one of his outstanding characteristics. McClellan got two shots at glory and made poor strategic, as well as tactical decisions both times - during the Peninsula Campaign and at Antietam. Lincoln could ill afford to retain the general.  The stakes were just as high in 1861 and 1862 as they were for Truman at the height of the Korean Conflict.  

  Ironically, as McPherson points out, the dismissed McClellan returned as Lincoln's opponent in the 1864 presidential election and might have defeated him if not for General Sherman's victories in Georgia. Following his removal from command in Korea, MacArthur returned to haunt the Truman administration and the Democratic party in 1952. The general received a hero's parade in New York City. Truman and the Democrats received the blame for the failure to win in Korea. Tried by war, both presidents paid a price.

  I 

[L_Monty]

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PhilsFolly wrote:

stuff 

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Wow, thanks very much! Welcome to the board!

I just wanted to get my official welcome out there before anybody trains their sights on any of your arguments.

[gegarland]

Excellent points P.; I'm not going to "train my guns" on your arguments as much as point out subtle and not so subtle distinctions. MacArthur matches McClellan in terms of ego, but at least MacArthur can claim competence at high level command. He succeeded in his theater in WWII, despite the fact that the ANZAC and British forces pretty much justifiably hated him for minimizing their efforts and grabbing the glory for himself and the USA. MacArthur's arrogance, aggression, and refusal to hold back to avoid antagonizing China and Russia led to his sacking, but he did have his Inchon. McClellan's arrogance, timidity, and refusal to attack led to his sacking. By any rights he should have had his "Inchon", his "Vicksburg", his "Gaugamela", his "Cannae" at Antietam. He just did not have it in him to do it. I'm not going to look up the exact quotes, but after all his blundering during the day with uncoordinated attacks that allowed Lee to hold he was

asked to commit his reserve divisions. The reserve commander said something along the lines of "These are our _last_ reserves", and McClellan backed down. Lee stood the next day with his battered army and his back to the river and dared McClellan to attack; McClellan couldn't do it. (NB: Not _would_ not do it; he personally _could_ not. The risk involved was to much for his lack of strength of character to overcome. Choosing to act when the blessed comfort of inaction was available was beyond his capabilities.)  I do not think McClellan _wanted_ to avoid combat; with his ego I think he truly believed he _was_ the "Young Napoleon". It is simply a matter that when confronted with the dire prospect of battle he _couldn't_ act. MacArthur screwed the pooch in the Philipines, but survived that and showed what he could do later. McClellan was lauded with unjustified praise for West Virginia early, and he never seemed to get over that premature ego-stroking.

A further analogy is that the Democratic opposition chose the ego-driven McClellan in 1864 and lost. MacArthur's political ambitions quickly sputtered out, and the Republican opposition chose the quietly competent Eisenhower and won.

[PhilsFolly]

   Thank you for your gentlemanly first salvo.  While I am in agreement with your evaluation of the relative merits of the two generals, I will ask: was MacArthur's attempted end-run around Truman any less insubordinate because he was a competent commander? If true, that would pose an interesting question.  If a president has no wartime experience, is he qualified to be Commander-in-Chief?  Article 2 of the Constitution does not specify that qualification. But MacArthur and McClellan tried to justify their decisions to challenge the orders of their presidents by taking this very argument to the media. 

  Has the issue of presidential v. military command in time of war been laid to rest as L-Monty asked?  Have the generals merely lost their hero status in the eyes of the public in the post-Vietnam era?  Have the Gulf War generals (both wars) decided not to dance the dance with Washington D.C.? In the 1990s, General Powell turned down the request to run for president.  But noting his polite, but deliberate exit from Bush's cabinet after four years, perhaps the generals have learned their lesson.  

[gegarland]

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PhilsFolly wrote:

   Thank you for your gentlemanly first salvo.  While I am in agreement with your evaluation of the relative merits of the two generals, I will ask: was MacArthur's attempted end-run around Truman any less insubordinate because he was a competent commander?

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No, it wasn't. MacArthur's prestige no doubt had many political operatives scrambling

around and literally wetting their pants, but Truman was not one of those people. Again

I am not going to look up the exact quote, but when he said in effect "I'm not going to let that S.O.B. resign; I'm going to fire him" Truman was re-affirming the covenent between the military and America that has existed since Washington faced down that potential military coup in 1782.

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 If true, that would pose an interesting question.  If a president has no wartime experience, is he qualified to be Commander-in-Chief?  Article 2 of the Constitution does not specify that qualification. But MacArthur and McClellan tried to justify their decisions to challenge the orders of their presidents by taking this very argument to the media. 

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That is a political question, not a factual question. The president is C-n-C by definition, _period_. You may argue that he (oops he or she, Hillary almost made it. Next thing you know there might actually be a black guy [uh... or girl] who could become president) is doing a bad job, but it is their job.

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  Has the issue of presidential v. military command in time of war been laid to rest as L-Monty asked?     

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Can you name an instance where it has been seriously challenged? Truman literally bitch-slapped MacArthur down. An unpopular president diss'd a hero. MacArthur dreamed of coasting into a presidential nomination, instead he just faded away.

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the generals merely lost their hero status in the eyes of the public in the post-Vietnam era?  Have the Gulf War generals (both wars) decided not to dance the dance with Washington D.C.?  have learned their lesson.  

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You are conflating two vastly different eras. Post-Vietnam anyone in the military can be a hero, but in the modern era military science is a trained skill. In the past leadership had virtually no distinction between politics and the military.